

Upstream Engineering




Chronicles of a FA engineer in GoM Operations

Oris C. Hernandez
09/13/2017

This document is classified BP Internal. Distribution is intended for BP authorized recipients only.

About Me



What I have learned from that Journey:



- Adapt to the environment, lots of things outside of your control, be creative!
 - Moving to US, pursuing M.Sc and Ph.D
- Ask, because you never know when you are going to get it
 - Financial aid for graduate school
 - FA TL role
- Don't be afraid of challenges, that's when you really grow
- Be nice to everyone, don't burn bridges!
 - After 13 years from leaving Technip, I report to the same person now at BP
- Work hard!!!!!!!

BP Internal


What is the role of Flow Assurance (FA) in Operations?



- **Interfacing** with asset teams and Contractors to assess the impact of **changing conditions**, new wells, workovers, interventions, and subsea tiebacks on existing systems.
- Providing technical support for and **monitoring** and evaluating of flow data, to confirm the risers and flow-lines are being operated and are performing within **design limits** or to **identify any anomalies**.
- Supporting BP's **engineering** application of tools and design methods for multiphase flow, in the context of FA, through delivering and directly managing modeling of **relevant flow scenarios**, and reviewing such scenarios on behalf of the GoM region when completed by contractors.
- **Engaging key stakeholders** as appropriate to convey understanding of multiphase flow and its relevance to their context (e.g. background to operating procedures, integrity management, control of systems, plant operating support tools) → **understand FA risks**
- Reviewing, updating and applying **FA strategies** of each system to **prevent line blockages** and **minimize operating downtime** as conditions change through field life.
- Providing FA operating philosophy to be executed by others i.e. chemical or operational requirements for FA both for steady state and transient conditions (start-up and shut-down)

BP Internal

Who do we interface with?




BP Internal

Where to start? Or how do you eat an elephant?



- Understand biggest risk / deferrals
 - Focused on hydrates in the beginning
- Understand your organization
 - Key interfaces / stakeholders
 - Threat ownership



Hydrates Decide Right

	STRATEGY				EXECUTION			
	Chemical Barrier	Mech / Other Barrier	Plant / Facilities Barrier	Res. / Wells Barrier	Chemical Barrier	Mech / Other Barrier	Plant / Facilities Barrier	Res. / Wells Barrier
Threat	PC	FA (OTO)	ES/SS ¹	N/A	Area	Area	Area	N/A

OTO = OVERALL THREAT OWNER responsible for strategy integration


¹ ES = topsides equipment / vessels, hardware, SS = SS equipment, hardware

BP Internal

Expect what you Inspect – what to monitor?



- Bowties as a communication tool
- Methodology used for risk assessment to communicate risk in one easy picture
- Barriers are physical risk reduction measures intended to prevent the incident from occurring, control its impact or frequency and/or mitigate its effect on people, the environment or our business
- Each barrier should be **independent and fully functional** → by itself should be able to completely stop a risk scenario from developing




BP Internal

Bowtie Model applied to Hydrate Risk



- Bowties as a communication tool



BP Internal

Expect what you Inspect – what to monitor?



Cause	Barrier	BP	Target	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
3. SD for Trans/Pumps	General	Hydrate Strategy Document	G: Doc. Valid (2 yr review) H: This. Out of review						
	2.1 Trans/Pump Installation	Trans CDT	G: Predicted CDT < Current CDT H: Predicted CDT < Current CDT I: within Actual CDT J: beyond Actual CDT						
	2.2 MaOH Displacement	MaOH injected within CDT							
	2.3 MaOH pre-treatment	MaOH Pumps / Umbilicals Availability	G: No known issues H: 0.95 < actual rate/target rate < 1.05 I: < 0.95 J: All wells can be pre-treated K: 1 or more wells cannot be pre-treated						
	2.4 LDH pre-treatment	LDH availability	G: No known issues H: 0.95 < actual rate/target rate < 1.05 I: < 0.95 J: All wells can be pre-treated K: 1 or more wells cannot be pre-treated						
		LDH effectiveness	G: No wells above LDH limit in 6 months forecast H: 1 or more wells potential to exceed it within 6 months I: 1 or more wells above LDH limit J: All wells can be pre-treated						
		LDH Hydraulics	G: No known issues H: 0.95 < actual rate/target rate < 1.05 I: < 0.95 J: All wells can be pre-treated K: 1 or more wells cannot be pre-treated						
		LDH Pumps / Umbilicals Availability	G: No known issues H: within CDT I: beyond CDT						
		DOD within CDT	G: Water content < limit H: Water content < limit I: No known issues						
	3.2 Dead Oil Displacement	Dead Oil QA/QC	G: No known issues H: No known issues I: No known issues J: No known issues K: No known issues						
1. SD for Flowlines	General	Dead Oil Rate	G: 0.95 < actual rate/target rate < 1.05 H: < 0.95 I: All wells can be pre-treated J: 1 or more wells cannot be pre-treated						
	3.3 MaOH pre-treatment	MaOH injected within CDT							
	3.4 LDH pre-treatment	LDH availability	G: No known issues H: 0.95 < actual rate/target rate < 1.05 I: < 0.95 J: All wells can be pre-treated K: 1 or more wells cannot be pre-treated						
		LDH effectiveness	G: No wells above LDH limit in 6 months forecast H: 1 or more wells potential to exceed it within 6 months I: 1 or more wells above LDH limit J: All wells can be pre-treated						
		LDH Hydraulics	G: No known issues H: 0.95 < actual rate/target rate < 1.05 I: < 0.95 J: All wells can be pre-treated K: 1 or more wells cannot be pre-treated						
		LDH Pumps / Umbilicals Availability	G: No known issues H: within CDT I: beyond CDT						
		DOD within CDT	G: Water content < limit H: Water content < limit I: No known issues						
		Dead Oil QA/QC	G: No known issues H: No known issues I: No known issues J: No known issues K: No known issues						
		Dead Oil Rate	G: 0.95 < actual rate/target rate < 1.05 H: < 0.95 I: All wells can be pre-treated J: 1 or more wells cannot be pre-treated						
		LDH availability	G: No known issues H: 0.95 < actual rate/target rate < 1.05 I: < 0.95 J: All wells can be pre-treated K: 1 or more wells cannot be pre-treated						

BP Internal

Where to start (cont...)




- Understand your models
 - Control models!
- Understand your procedures
 - Are Operators following the procedures?
 - Do procedures make sense?
 - Key Performance Indicator (KPIs)!!!!
- Develop and maintain FA strategies → and then update procedures
- Procedures, Strategies, KPI's are evergreen, need to be updated depending on how things change
- Communicate, communicate & then communicate some more
 - Once strategies & procedures are up-to-date, make sure EVERYONE that needs to know, REALLY KNOWS ... particularly when risk events are low frequency
- Statistics don't always help in FA:
 - Your KPI may have been green 99% of the time, what happens if it fails once?



BP Internal

Speaking of statistics...




- For a large proportion of unplanned shutdowns, our platforms can recover (restart production or perform dead oil displacement) within a short time frame
- We still need to be prepared and design for that small proportion of instances where we can exceed cooldown time
 - Low probability / High Consequence Scenario

BP Internal

Some lessons: Reaching CDT doesn't always mean trouble



- Dry tree facility where we have been moving from a hydrate avoidance to hydrate management
- Very short cooldown times
- Historical instances (planned and unplanned) → full hydrate blockages do not form when fluids have WC and GOR with predicted hydrate volume fraction below 20%.



Ref: Kurup et al, "Pushing Conventional Boundaries of Hydrate Management in a Dry Tree Facility", OTC-27780, 2017

BP Internal

Some lessons: valves leak!



- Hydrate incidents in non-producing jumpers
- Dead oil displacement or MeOH used to safe out the jumper for setting the dead leg
- A few months later, when attempting to re-instate production through that jumper, a hydrate blockage has been found
- Typically remediated "easily" with MeOH injection

Check valves:

- Have had issues of blockages in umbilicals due to backflow of production fluids, even hydrated MeOH lines

BP Internal


Some lessons: hydrates **can** form under SD conditions



- Hydrates in dead leg jumpers
- System treated with LDHI (AA) but beyond maximum water cut qualification limit (tight emulsion?)
 - When attempting to restart after a month, hydrate was already there
- System treated with dead oil, but not enough dead oil volume
 - 2 days after we thought the system was hydrate-safe, again hydrate was there
- Emulsion properties of the system play a big part in hydrate blockage formation

BP Internal

Understanding of blockages




Picture Source: <https://worldviewofjesus.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/evolution.jpg>

BP Internal

Monitoring for solids deposition



- DP in the line increased over 1000 psi in less than a week
- Since then we monitor $FF = DP \text{ friction (field)}/DP \text{ friction (model)}$
- Based on this incident, we have set limits
- We use this limit to determine when to pig the line or perform xylene soaks in the well
 - Constant challenge with balancing the risk of stuck pig and deferrals associated with pigging & well being down for xylene soak




BP Internal

Some tricky problems: CI impact on water separation



- Mature field, with wells that experience difficulty to unload post shutdown
- Riser/flowline would be flowing steadily, and when attempting to restart corrosion inhibitor injection (CI), the riser will load up and result in flow instability and ultimately shut-in of the well
- Cycling the valve for as short as 5 seconds will result in issues
 - Inability to handle slugging sometimes leads to shut-in of the riser, dead oil circulation, difficult to restart the wells
 - production deferrals
 - loss of corrosion inhibitor injection could potentially affect the pipeline integrity (corrosion engineers not happy..)




BP Internal

Some tricky problems: CI impact on water separation




- Because of sub-ambient pressures, umbilical is overbalanced, opening the valve even for a few seconds results in a surge of chemical into the flowline → very high concentrations of CI, much higher than normal operation
- High concentrations of CI result in water drop out in the riser, because of relatively low flow rates water struggles to flow up the riser → loading




BP Internal

When OLGA is good, it is good! – P, T benchmark




When OLGA is good, it is good! – Degassing time



But when OLGA fails



Slugging



- Water sweep is overestimated
- MeOH displacement, OLGA predicts piston like displacement, no mixing with the water phase
- JT heating across perforations → OLGA does not consider heat loss to the soil

OLGA is a tool, not the end all be all ...

Typical day of a FA engineer in Ops



- Monitor KPI's
- Work with cross discipline teams on potential upcoming activities → things are always changing (new wells added, wells offline, equipment unavailable, re-routing)
- Participate in risk assessments for upcoming operations
- Improve monitoring tools
- Update FA strategies
- Share lessons with others in FA Community

What do you need to be successful?

- Be quick on your feet
- Communicate effectively with others
- Be proactive
- Be restless
- Be creative and challenge the "we've always done it this way", when needed
- Be outspoken

BP Internal

Concluding Remarks



- FA designs are typically conservative, for good reason!
 - In operations we will push the design much further than what was originally envisioned
 - Design conservatism has allowed us to "get away" with some potentially sticky situations
- Valves leak
- Bowties are very effective communication tools
- Document, Document, Document
- Learn from every incident
 - What you don't learn now will come back to haunt you later
- It takes a village, flow assurance strategies require interfaces with a lot of people
- Be nice to EVERYONE!!!

BP Internal
